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Introduction

arbon reduction projects follow a cycle that includes
conceptualization, due diligence, implementation,
documentation, audit or validation, and finally certification, with the eventual issuance of verified, serialized carbon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets. To fulfill
this process, there are several technical elements that must be
addressed: monitoring or measurement, reporting, and verification (“MRV”), permanence (i.e. ensuring the project’s duration),
leakage (i.e. addressing negative and identifying positive offsite
impacts), and additionality.
Additionality is a test that a carbon reduction project must
meet to ensure the project would not have been implemented
without the revenue of the carbon markets.1 This test of additionality must be satisfied if the project is being submitted to the
voluntary carbon markets—for which, voluntary buyers want to
be ensured their donations actually matter for a project—or to
the compliance markets since buyers need to be confident that
regulators will accept their carbon reduction purchase.
It is important to further note that all of the most prominent
carbon reduction certification standards—again, whether a compliance market under the Kyoto Protocol or an internationally
recognized voluntary standard—require some type of additionality test. This includes, but is not limited to, the following certification standards: the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”),2
Center for Resource Solutions (“CRS”),3 Green-e Climate
Protocol for Renewable Energy,4 Chicago Climate Exchange
(“CCX”),5 Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”),6 Climate
Action Reserve (“CAR”),7 Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard (“CCBS”),8 Gold Standard,9 Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),10 and the Verified Carbon Standard
(“VCS”).11
Additionality is an important requirement because if nonadditional (i.e. “business-as-usual”) projects are eligible for carbon finance, then the net amount of greenhouse gas emissions
will continue to increase and the environmental integrity of carbon reduction projects will be called into question. For example,
if a project was already far exceeding its industry average return
on investment and was implemented over fifty years ago when
no carbon markets existed, why should this particular project
also be eligible for additional revenue from the carbon markets?
Similarly, if an activity was legally required, then why should
this activity of a regulated entity also be eligible for additional
revenue from the carbon markets? The challenge with additionality, however, is that one must prove a counterfactual argument
(i.e. what would have otherwise happened in the absence of a
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project) to ensure the project provides carbon reductions that
would not have otherwise occurred. This article explores the different concepts of additionality, while acknowledging its controversial elements and proposing inclusion of some important
considerations to ensure net emissions reductions.

Legal or Regulatory Additionality
Legal additionality, or what is sometimes referred to as
regulatory additionality or surplus, is perhaps the most objective type of additionality. If a law exists and a given activity
is regulated, then the project is most likely not eligible for carbon finance. Therefore, for a project to meet the legal additionality standard, it must provide carbon reductions beyond those
required by law.12
To put this in context, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) regulates large municipal solid waste (“MSW”)
landfills, and according to the Climate Action Reserve’s Landfill
Project Protocol Version 3.0, “[t]here are several EPA regulations for MSW landfills that have a bearing on the eligibility of
methane collection and destruction projects as voluntary GHG
reduction projects.”13
Two challenges with legal additionality are that on one
hand, the concept might create perverse incentives, and on
the other hand, sometimes following the law is not common
practice. With the first idea in mind, the Montreal Protocol is
an international treaty designed to phase out the production of
ozone depleting substances (“ODS”).14 While the United States,
Canada, and European nations have phased out the production
of hydrofluorocarbons (“HFC”), which are ODSs and greenhouse gases, the largest contributor of certified emission reductions (“CER”) under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism are from HFC projects in China and India.15 Since
legal additionality would rule out the eligibility of HFC projects hosted in China and India if these countries were to pass
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domestic laws eliminating the production of HFCs, they have
little incentive to begin regulating HFCs. If they did pass regulations, China and India would experience a reduction of foreign investment towards the purchase of these carbon reduction
credits and would need to use their own public funds to phase
out HFCs. Due to the perception that manufacturers are actually
producing excess HFCs, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme will no longer accept these HFC reduction credits
beginning in 2013.16 Another example of this legal additionality challenge is the tough predicament a government might face
when contemplating the passage of a strict feed-in tariff or an
aggressive renewable portfolio standard. Such a passage would
effectively legally require an increase in renewable energy production, however, there would be fewer carbon reduction credits
from these renewable energy sources eligible for purchase from
international buyers.
On the second challenge of additionality, there are legal
reserve requirements on private property in Brazil. Depending
on the region (e.g. Amazon Region versus Cerrado Region), a
landowner is restricted from using twenty to eighty percent of
his or her land.17 However, it is a somewhat common practice—
particularly in the remote Amazon—to illegally clear forests
from the legal reserve.18 Now, if such practices are deemed to be
common, should legal additionality still apply and thus prevent
the reforestation of this fallow land using carbon finance?
Corruption also presents challenges for ensuring the legal
additionality of a project. There are currently carbon reduction projects either certified or under development in Ethiopia,
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Kenya, and Venezuela.19 Yet, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2009 rates
Ethiopia as the 126th most corrupt country out of 180 countries,
Nicaragua as the 134th, the Philippines as the 141st, Kenya as
the 147th, and Venezuela as the 158th.20 Where projects provide
much needed financing in developing countries with already
corrupt infrastructures, there may be a disincentive to upgrade
or improve legal frameworks that could reduce the number of
carbon reduction projects.
The evolving regional compliance carbon markets of the
U.S.—which are the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (“Accord”)—have
Canadian Provinces and Mexican States as either participants
or observers.21 As these regional programs transform, it will be
interesting to see how state or national laws, and thus legal additionality, will be applied.

Common Practice or Technological
Additionality
Common practice additionality, which could incorporate
either the technological or market penetration of a given project
type based on its geography, is another objective additionality
test. The aspect of geography is important because what is prevalent in one location—for example, wind turbines in Texas or
solar photovoltaic systems in California—might not be so prevalent in other locations (i.e. such as New Hampshire or Alaska).
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According to the American Carbon Registry’s standard, common practice is determined by whether there is “widespread
deployment of the project . . . within the relevant geographic
area.”22 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard defines it as one
which is “not common practice in the sector/region, compared
with projects that have received no carbon finance.” 23
Yet, how does one define common practice and what specifically would be the particular geographic focus (i.e. a country, state, local electric grid)? Perhaps one of most controversial
examples surrounding common practice was the Chicago Climate Exchange’s acceptance of soil conservation carbon reduction projects (i.e. also known as no-till), which were previously
enrolled in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation
Reserve Program.24 Under this program, farmers were rewarded
by the purchase of their carbon reduction credits for activities
that they were already undertaking without revenue from the
carbon markets.25 If a regulated industry is allowed to emit
greenhouse gas emissions because they are supporting non-additional carbon offset projects, then the environmental integrity of
the system should be called into question because the net greenhouse gas emissions will continue to increase. Climate Action
Reserve (“Reserve”) aptly points out that there are many difficulties in actually defining the common practice of a region. 26
According to Derek Six, the Portfolio Manager for Environmental Credit Corporation, the best assessment of additionality
would be the use of a market penetration approach.27 Such an
approach, which is similar to common practice, would incorporate knowledge and technology barriers to implementation,
along with financial aspects of additionality.28 For example,
agricultural methane destruction or agricultural methane gas-toenergy projects are only installed on about 0.5% of U.S. farms.29
Thus under a market penetration approach, all agricultural methane destruction and agricultural methane gas-to-energy projects would be eligible for carbon finance whether or not there
were projects clustered in a specific region (e.g. California) or
whether a particular project had a slightly higher financial return
(i.e. financial additionality).

Financial Additionality
Many carbon market participants are averse to the concept
of financial additionality, which is much more subjective than
legal additionality or common practice. Likewise, financial
additionality is difficult to determine due to matters of confidentiality, proprietary internal business decisions, and the potential
use of arbitrary metrics. The Clean Development Mechanism,
which refers to financial additionality as the investment analysis, considers whether the project would have been financially
attractive without the revenue from carbon reduction credits.30
The Verified Carbon Standard considers financial additionality, which it defines as an investment barrier and a subset of
implementation barriers.31 The American Carbon Registry also
considers financial additionality a subset of implementation barriers and asks whether funding from carbon reduction credits
will incentivize the project’s implementation.32
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Confidential and proprietary internal business matters that
make financial additionality a subjective and difficult assessment include, but are not limited to:
• Capital budgeting decisions (i.e. which projects will get
funded and why?)
• Financing sources (e.g. banks, internal funds, venture
capitalists)
• Portfolio of available projects (i.e. what alternative investments/projects are possible?)
• Required internal rate of return (“IRR”), return on assets
(“ROA”), return on equity (“ROE”), and/or payback
period (i.e. which metric does a firm use and what is the
requirement?)
While the Clean Development Mechanism has an extensive
discussion on appropriate metrics for financial additionality
(i.e. discount rates and benchmarks), arbitrary metrics such as
the following could be used as justification for allowing or not
allowing a project to count as eligible for carbon finance:
• Companies of the same size (e.g. in terms of money and/or
employees)
• Geographical location (e.g. country, sub-national, local
electric grid)
• Length of time company is in business
• Public vs. private ownership
This said, how do you compare a small, specialized renewable
energy company to a large, diversified provider? Similarly, do
start-ups differ from “well-established” companies enough
to present a challenge when comparing financial additionality
thresholds? Also, how does the ownership structure (i.e. nonprofit, limited liability corporation, type C corporation, publicowned entity, joint-ownership) impact financial decisions and
thus, financial additionality?
Applying financial additionality across a broad spectrum
of project types is another significant challenge, posing many
serious questions. Likewise, why should carbon markets reward
projects that demonstrate the poorest financials? If two different
projects existed and with one thousand dollars, one could reduce
one thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide and the other could
reduce one hundred metric tons, why should the one hundred
metric tons project be considered more financially additional?
On the other hand, why reward projects that already have “superior” returns and that existed before the formation of carbon
markets (i.e. a question which relates to voluntary buyers wanting their donations to matter)?
Financial additionality should be phased out of future certification standards and new revisions of current certification standards, a position supported by Green-e Climate.33

Project-By-Project Additionality
Under the project-by-project test for additionality, each project individually undergoes a series of additionality tests according to the given standard. Two main standards, which apply a
project-by-project additionality test, are the Clean Development Mechanism and the Verified Carbon Standard. The Clean
Development Mechanism is the carbon reduction standard for
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Certified Emission Reductions (“CER”) for the Kyoto Protocol’s international compliance market.34 In contrast, the Verified
Carbon Standard is the leading voluntary carbon markets standard, in terms of market share, and has adopted methodologies
from the CDM.35
Essentially, project proponents—whether referring to investors, project developers, landowners or buyers—need to assess
whether each and every individual project meets the additionality tests. Such a process can be expensive, time-consuming (i.e.
reduces scalability and time-to-market), and difficult for both the
general public and local communities to grasp. Furthermore, it is
difficult for auditors to determine an individual project’s subjective assertions, especially with regard to financial additionality.

Performance or Sectoral Additionality
Many current and evolving certification standards—including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative, and the Climate Action Reserve—are adopting
performance or sectoral approaches to additionality. Essentially,
such performance or sectoral approaches use a uniform additionality test or benchmark, which could be based on an industry or
geographic region. It is important to note, the same additionality
criteria—such as legal, common practice/technology, and financial—can be applied to a performance or sectoral approach, the
main difference is that such criteria are not uniquely applied to
each single project. Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) offset projects may not be government ordered
projects, may not receive incentives from RGGI auction proceeds, and must meet certain requirements to qualify.36
Recent discussions of the WCI indicate that it will attempt
to set a standardized baseline for offset protocols that reflect
the strictest regulatory and legal requirements.37 The Climate
Action Reserve uses standardized performance based tests for
additionality because they are administratively easier to implement and less subjective.38
For the level of scalability required to address global climate change, there needs to be a near-full transition to sectoral
or performance benchmarks for additionality. To this end, one
of the decisions made at the sixteenth session of the Conference
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, was for the Clean Development Mechanism to work towards standardized baselines and
additionality tests.39 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard
has convened a steering committee, which is developing “VCS
requirements and guidance on performance benchmark and
technology test approaches to baselines/additionality.”40

Conclusion
Carbon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets, are
an effective cost-containment mechanism and have the potential
to produce greenhouse gas reductions alongside a host of cobenefits (e.g. local jobs, technology transfer, reforesting critical
wildlife habitat). However, the general public, regulators, and
environmentalists do not want to hear, “well we were already
doing the project and we are doing nothing different, but now
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

we are getting revenue from the carbon markets.” To ensure
overall reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, additionality is
a useful technical tool to ensure the integrity of carbon reduction

projects, but certification standards should be less concerned
about financial additionality and more focused on transitioning
to sectoral or performance approaches.
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